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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
Case No.
vs.

13386

BRIAN EDWARD MAGUIRE,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal brought by the appellant Brian
Edward Maguire from a judgment rendered in the District Court of the Third Judicial District of Utah, the
Honorable Ernest F. Baldwin, finding appellant Maguire
guilty of murder in the second degree.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The appellant Brian Edward Maguire was charged
with the crime of murder in the first degree and appeared
before the Honorable Ernest F. Baldwin, where said apDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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pellant moved for a trial without jury. The motion was
granted and appeUant Maguire was found guilty of
murder in the second degree and was committed to the
Utah State Prison for a term of ten years to life.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent respectfully seeks affirmation of the trial
court, finding the appellant Maguire guilty of murder in
the second degree, and denying appellant's request for a
new trial.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The respondent agrees with the facts set forth in
appellant's brief with the following additions or corrections:
1) The altercation on the evening of October 29,
1972, concerned itself with an argument between the
appellant Brian Maguire and Peter Petersen in Petersen's home about Maguire "messing around" with Petersen's girlfriends (R. 240-245). The appellant later took
Mr. Petersen's girlfriend, Sheryl, to the apartment of
Mr. Petersen's wife, Susan Nelson. Because the appellant
so acted, Mr. Petersen found Mr. Maguire and Sheryl
at the apartment (R. 174), cuffed the appellant (R. 187)
and slapped Sheryl (R. 187). The appellant and Petersen then exited to the parking lot after which Mr. Petersen returned and said to his wife that Maguire had a
.38 caliber gun, but that he wasn^t scared (R. 188).
2) The appellant testified that soon after leaving
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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the motel he had trouble with his automobile lights and
that Mr. Petersen stopped, offered assistance, and asked
the appellant if he wanted a lift home (R. 254-256).
3) Maguire testified that upon arriving at an alleyway he refused to get out of the car after Mr. Petersen
told him to do so (R. 260-262). Appellant continued to
refuse to get out of the car even though he testified that
he had always retreated from Mr. Petersen before (R.
319-320).
4) Mr. Maguire testified that his memory was
somewhat hazy but indicated in his testimony that he
snapped out of his "condition" (R. 313) to remember
the incidents leading to the shooting. He further testified
that he could not recall Mr. Petersen reaching to the
glove compartment for the gun even though he would
have had to reach over the appellant to get it (R. 135).
5) Appellant Maguire admitted lunging for the gun
after which it went off (R. 262), but nothing was said
as to it causing injury. Mr. Petersen's left hand was admittedly on the left side of the steering wheel at the time
appellant lunged for the gun. Mr. Maguire testified that
Mr. Petersen then lunged at him and the gun went off
and hit the deceased in the forehead (R. 263). Dr. Taylor testified that two bullets entered the head, one in the
forehead and one entering the rear of the head (R. 137).
Either bullet would have caused instant unconsciousness
(R. 137). Mr. Maguire testified about only the bullet in
the forehead.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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6) At trial, the appellant moved to waive trial by
jury (R. 61). Discussion ensued with the appellant as
to his understanding of that request after which the
motion was granted (R. 51, T. 62). Later in the proceedings after the prosecution rested, the court ruled
that first degree murder would not be considered and
that second degree murder and voluntary manslaughter
would be the only two possibilities (R. 214).
7) The lower court found that sufficient evidence
existed for the malice aforethought needed for second
degree murder and ordered that Mr. Maguire be imprisoned in the Utah State Prison for ten years to life.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN ALLOWING THE APPELLANT TO WAIVE
TRIAL BY JURY IN THE CASE AT BAR.
A.
THE COURT'S RULING IN A PREVIOUS
CASE OF MURDER IN THE FIRST DEGREE WHERE THE JUDGE AND DEFENSE ATTORNEY WERE THE SAME
AND UPON WHICH THE DEFENSE ATTORNEY APPARENTLY RELIED, GOVERNED THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE
CASE AT BAR EXCLUDING ALL POSSIDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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BILITY THAT THE DEATH PENALTY
COULD BE IMPOSED.
Appellant Maguire relies upon Utah Code Ann. §
77-27-2 (1953), in support of his argument that he could
not waive jury trial in the present case. The pertinent
language of the statute is as follows:
"Issues of fact must be tried by a jury, but
in all cases except where a sentence of death
may be imposed, trial by jury may be waived by
the defendant. Such waiver shall be made in
open court and entered in the minutes." (Emphasis added.)
A cursory reading of this language makes it appear
that in every capital case a trial by jury is an absolute
which cannot be waived. Respondent contends, however,
that the standard so claimed is not absolute, but hinges
solely on the determination whether the "death penalty"
may be imposed.
Since the United States Supreme Court rendered its
decision in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U. S. 238, 92 S. Ct.
2726, 33 L, Ed. 2d 346 (1972), the status of the death
penalty has been relatively uncertain in Utah as well
as throughout the United States. Despite this fact,
effects of Furman on the present case need only be examined lightly, since respondent submits that the death
penalty did not apply to his particular case, and since
it did not, the alleged "absolute" standard of Utah Code
Ann. § 77-27-2, supra, did not apply.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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In State of Utah v. Donald Leith Christean and
Vernon Wayne Rogers, Case No. 13510, presently pending before this Court, Judge Baldwin ruled on March
12, 1973, on the opening day of trial, that Utah's death
penalty was unconstitutional and that it could not be
applied. Mr. Gil Athay of the Legal Defender's Association was the defense attorney in that action and had
previously requested Judge Baldwin to make a ruling
on that issue.
In the present case, Mr. Gil Athay, once again was
the attorney before Judge Baldwin. Following the same
procedure he used in the Christean case, Mr. Athay
moved for the jury to be waived. This motion was made
on April 30, 1973, just six weeks after Judge Baldwin's
previous ruling in the Christean case. Again, Mr. Athay's
motion was granted.
Whether Judge Baldwin misconstrued Furman in
the previous case is not paramount. What is important
is the fact that the judge ruled that the "law of the case"
was that the death penalty would not be imposed. Likewise, in the present case, Judge Baldwin allowed the
defendant to waive a trial by jury. It was not necessary
for Mr. Athay to obtain another ruling regarding Utah's
death penalty because Mr. Athay was fully aware of the
Judge's ruling in the Christean case. The ruling made
in the previous case became the law of that court and as
such continued to control all subsequent situations of
like nature coming before the judge since the judge never
specifically ruled otherwise.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Since Mr. Athay undoubtedly conversed with his
client regarding Judge Baldwin's previous ruling in the
Christean case and knew perfectly well that the court
would so rule again if called upon, the appellant cannot
now claim that irreparable damage was done. It is difficult to see how the appellant can claim prejudice when
before the defense presented its case the court ruled that
only second degree murder or voluntary manslaughter
would be considered, and that the charge of first degree
murder was dismissed. Furthermore, all parties knew
that the court would not apply the death penalty. This
was known prior to the commencement of and during
the trial. The transcript, as well as all circumstances
surrounding the trial make this point clear. Despite
this, appellant Maguire was not even convicted of that
for which he claims prejudice, but was instead convicted
of a lesser charge. Thus, no prejudice took place, and
appellant Maguire was given the benefit of the doubt
in dropping of the charge of first degree murder by the
Court.
Appellant Maguire cites State v. James, 30 Utah
2d 32, 512 P. 2d 1031 (1973), and Roll v. Larsen, 30 Utah
2d 271, 516 P. 2d 1392 (1973), in support of his position
that a jury trial in his case could not be waived. Neither
case is on point. A careful reading of James and Roll
indicates that the court merely held that "capital" cases
still exist in Utah. The entire opinions center around
discussions of the "classification" theory of offenses and
how that theory stands in light of Furman. Respondent
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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concedes and agrees with the court's opinions in James
and Roll that certain offenses are still capital in nature.
The Court said in James:
"The Constitution of the state has provided
a system of classifying certain serious offenses
as capital cases and then mandated a specific
procedural structure for the administration of
justice based on that classification. Furman v.
Georgia cannot be rationally construed as abrogating our fundamental law."
The procedural structure referred to is that defendants may waive a jury trial in all cases except where
the death penalty may be imposed. Therefore, in capital
cases where a death penalty may be a reality, one must
be tried by a jury of twelve. In the present case, however, it was the "law of the case" that the death penalty
could not be imposed, thus allowing a waiver of jury trial,
which means a waiver of the twelve man jury as prescribed by James. See Straka v. Voyles, 69 Utah 123,
252 P. 2d 677 (1929), which discusses the concept of
"law of the case." Thus, it must be concluded that capital offenses still exist in Utah, but that the waiver of the
jury trial in the instant case was and is not governed by
the James and Roll cases as asserted by the appellant.
The respondent therefore submits that no prejudice
exists which would demand the reversal for a new trial.
The understanding of all parties involved made the possibility of the death penalty a nullity and the court further
eliminated the possibility of a conviction for first degree
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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murder. Therefore, the trial court's findings should be
sustained,
B.
JURY TRIAL IS WAIVABLE BY DEFENDANTS IN CAPITAL CASES, AND UTAH
CONSTITUTIONAL AND S T A T U T O R Y
LANGUAGE IS NO BAR THERETO.
Though a first reading of Utah constitutional and
statutory provisions appear to indicate otherwise, there
is sitrong reason to allow waiver of jury trials in those
cases raised by appellant. Absolute standards can be
detrimental to those whom they are designed to protect.
Flexibility must exist to prevent undue prejudice if the
defendants in particular instances feel such would take
place.
"Supposed fairness" is the argument used to establish the sanctity of a jury trial — especially in capital
cases. This philosophy of fairness is deeply rooted in the
common law. Such background led to Utah's enactment
of Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-2 on which appellant's arguments are based. Basically, this protection was used to
protect individuals from the tyranny of the state. Today's "Due Process" procedures make available to an
accused the protections upon which the jury trial system
was based. The standards now insure that protections
will be afforded and followed — the courts being the
determiner of their effectiveness. The langauge emphaDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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sized by the appellant is merely a verbal expression
pointing out the importance of keeping the right to jury
trial a reality. This simply means that such a right cannot be destroyed or ignored and that such a right shall
always exist.
Art. I, § 10 of the Utah Constitution says:
"In capital cases, the right of trial by jury
remain inviolate" (Emphasis added.)
"Inviolate" has been defined in jurisdictions such
as Washington, State v. Furth, 5 Wash, 2d 1, 104 P. 2d
925 (1940), to mean that the right cannot be "impaired"
or "abridged" in any way, but must always exist. Utah
Code Ann. § 77-27-2 takes this language and attempts to
make the standard absolute. In other words, the statute
attempits to make jury trials absolute in certain instances
even though the Constitution does not go that far. The
propriety of attempting to expand the constitutional
lanugauge without constitutional amendment is clearly
questionable. The Constitution merely provides that
the right is absolute, but does not state that the application of that right is absolute or that the right can;
never be waived.
Respondent contends that many circumstances can
arise where an accused charged with murder in the first
degree would desire to waive a jury trial. The article
"Waiver of Trial by Jury in Criminal Cases," 25 Michigan Law Review 695 (1927), lists what could be conDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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sidered a few of the reasons. The list contain the following:
1) The charge is af a revolting nature.
2)

The entire state or community is aroused.

3) The past record of accused is bad.
4)

Public sentiment might influence jury.

5)

Great deal of publicity before trial.

6)

It is a prosecution involving race.

7)

Judges' greater experience can be valuable to the accused.

8)

Feeling that the jury will convict on general principles instead of evidence.

9)

Confidence in fairer trial by judiciary.

10)

Reluctance to go to trial on complicated
issues.

11) A desire to avoid the cumbersomeness and
delay of a jury trial.
Certainly, these eleven reasons are not all inclusive,
but they $how that an absolute standard could work as
a detriment in specific instances. It is obvious that in
many cases it may be advantageous to have a trial by
a judge without a jury — to deny such a choice might
in itself deny the accused the right to a fair trial and
make the jury an instrument of oppression rather than
a means of "fair protection."
The Ohio Supreme Court held many years ago in
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Hoffman v. State, 98 Ohio St. 137, 120 N. E. 234 (1918),

that:
"Clearly this right [of jury trial] is for the
benefit of the accused. If he regards it in the
particular case as a burden, a hardship, a prejudice to a fair trial, why in the name of reason
should he not be permitted to waive it and submit his cause to the magistrate . . . What was
given to him generally as a shield should not
be used as a sword in case he feels that a jury
trial in such a case would so result."
The Utah Supreme Court recognizes that ciroumstances exist in which a jury trial may be waived without
ever trying the case to establish the facts. The court has
openly acknowledged through its decisions that the plea
of guilty, made in open court, takes the place of trial
and verdict. Thus, if an accused in a first degree murder
case enters a plea of guilty it is clear that he effectively
waives jury trial even though the offense may be punishable by death.
In State v. Stewart, 110 Utah 203, 171 P. 2d 383
(1946), the Utah Supreme Count established that a plea
of guilty dispenses with the jury because the plea is the
same as if a jury had found the accused guilty. The
court said:
"He contends that the evidence shows that
he pleaded guilty as a matter of convenience,
and that a plea of guilty does not amount to a
conviction, Such novel argument is specious.
Unless timely withdrawn, a plea of guilty places
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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a defendant in the same position as a verdict of
a jury finding him guilty of the charge after
a fair and impartial trial. A plea of guilty is a
confession of the correctness of the accusation
which dispenses with the necessity of proof
thereof."
This holding was recently reaffirmed in Coombs v. Turner, 25 Utah 2d 397, 383 P. 2d 437 (1971), when the
court said:
"A plea of guilty dispenses with the necessity of proof, and the issue of innocence or guilt
cannot here be relitigated any more than it could
be alter a jury verdict of guilty."
Patton v. United States, 281 U. S. 276, 50 S. Ct.
253, 74 L. Ed. 854 (1930), involved the interpretation
of Art. Ill, § 2, paragraph 3 of the United States Constitution requiring jury trial in all criminal cases. In rejecting this absolute standard and language the Court
stated:
"In the light of the foregoing it is reasonable to conclude that the framers of the Constitution simply were intent upon preserving the
right of trial by jury primarily for the protection
of the accused . . .
Upon this view of the constitutional provisions we conclude that article 3, § 2, is not jurisdictional, but was meant to confer a right upon
the accused which he may forego at his election,
to deny his power to do so is to convert a privilege into an imperative requirement . . .
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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After an extensive review of the authorities
and a discussion of the question on principle, the
court concluded that, since it was permissible
for an accused person to plead guilty and thus
waive any trial, he must necessarily be able to
waive a jury trial." . . .
See also Mason v. United States, 250 F. 2d 705 (10th
Or. 1957).
In light of the foregoing authority, it seems unreasonable to permit an accused to dispense with every
stage of trial by a plea of guilty, and yet forbid him to
dispense with a particular form of trial (trial by jury)
by consent or waiver. These inconsistencies must give
way to the better reasoned rule that the right to trial
by jury — even in light of the statutory language of
Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-2 — is not absolute but must
depend on circumstances in each particular case. Such
a waiver is not contrary to sound conceptions of fairness
or public policy. If, for instance, the court rules that the
death penalty will not apply in a particular case, then
it is not error for the accused to waive the jury.
The law permits venue to insure a fair trial, or to
allow the accused the best position. Why then, if an
individual honestly feels he would be judged more fairly
by a judge sitting without a jury should we force him to
have his case heard by a jury? This type of force runs
counter to Utah's as well as the United States' conception of justice.
New York had no difficulty in realizing that this
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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force should not be used. Art. I, § 2 of the New York
Constitution is as explicit as Utah's statute and yet,
the Court allowed waiver. The pertinent language of the
New York Constitution is as follows:
"Trial by jury in all cases in which it has
heretofore been guaranteed by constitutional
provision shall remain inviolate forever * * *
A jury trial may be waived by the defendant
in all criminal cases, except those in which the
crime charged may be punishable by death, by a
written instrument signed by the defendant in
person in open court before and with the approval of a judge or justice of a court having
jurisdiction to try the offense."
This constitutional provision was interpreted by the
New York Court in People v. Duchin, 12 N. Y. 2d 351,
190 N. E. 2d 17 (1963), where an individual charged with
rape in the first degree, assault in the second degree,
carnal abuse of a child . . ., waived jury trial and later
challenged that waiver on appeal. The court held that
the jury trial may be waived in all cases despite the
language of the constitution. The majority held that if
an intelligent and knowing waiver is made, the jury may
be waived. The court said:
"The provision is designed for the benefit
of the defendant. When, choosing to be tried
by a judge alone he requests a waiver, he is entitled to it as a matter of right once it appears
to the satisfaction of the judge of the court having jurisdiction that, first, the waiver is tendered
in good faith and is not a stratagem to procure
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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an otherwise impermissible procedural advantage
— . . . and, second, that the defendant is fully
aware of the consequences of the choice he is
making."
Further, Article 12 of the Massachusetts Constitution contains the following language regarding jury trials:
"And the legislature shall not make any law
that shall subject any person to a capital or infamous punishment . . . without trial by jury."
In interpreting this language, the Massachusetts Court
held in Commonwealth v. Rowe, 153 N. E. 537 (Mass,
1926), that:
"We find nothing in the words of our Constitution which declares or manifests an intention to deprive the individual of power to refuse
to assert his constitutional right to trial by jury."
Thus, it can be clearly seen that there is support
to the proposition that an individual can waive jury trial
in capital offenses such as the one at bar.
It is further established that nearly all rights granted
by the United States Constitution may be waived. The
only ones which appear to conflict with such a statement
are "due process" or "equal protection" rights which
themselves are made up of the other waivable rights —
such as trial by jury.
The United States Supreme Court has accepted the
philosophy and subsequently established it by holding
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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that "knowing and intelligent waiver of constitutional
guarantees is only needed for those guarantees affecting
due process." Scheckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U. S. 218,
93 S. Ct. 2041, 361 F. 2d 854 (1973). The court recognizes
that it is wrong to force rights upon an individual if he
does not want their protection. Rights are afforded individuals to insure their protection. If such protections
are not wanted, not needed, or possible detriments to an
accused, he should have the unalterable right to say "I
don't want that right."
The following are some of the rights which have been
held to be waivable. (1) Right to jury trial in criminal
cases. Patton v. United States, 281 U. S. 276, 50 S. Ot.
353 (1930). (2) Right against self-incrimination. Schmerber v. State of California, 384 U. S. 757, 86 S. Ct. 1826,
16 L. Ed. 2d 908 (1966). (3) Right to confront witnesses. Illinois v. Allen, 397 U. S. 337, 90 S. Ct. 1057,
25 L. Ed. 353 (1970). (4) Right to a speedy trial. Barker
v. Wingo, 407 U. S. 514, 92 S. Ct. 2182, 33 L. Ed. 2d 101
(1972). (5) Right to Counsel. Argersinger v. Hamlin,
407 U. S. 25, 92 S. Ct. 2006, 32 L. Ed. 2d 530 (1972).
(6) Search and Seizure protections. Katz v. United
States, 389 U. S. 347, 88 S. Ot. 507, 19 L. Ed. 2d 576
(1967). (7) Grand Jury indictment. Smith v. United
States, 360 U. S. 1, 79 S. Ct. 991, 31 L. Ed. 2d 1041 (1959).
These few cases are, of course, only a representative
sample of the many waivable rights. An individual of
normal competence and intelligence should have some
power over determining his future. He had that right
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when the crimes were committed. He should also have
that right in relation to the consequences thereto.
It is, therefore, submitted that public policy supports the view that an accused should be permitted to
waive his right to jury trial.
POINT II.
THE APPELLANT SHOULD NOT BE PERMITTED TO CLAIM REVERSIBLE ERROR
(IF ERROR THERE WAS) SINCE SUCH
ERROR WAS INDUCED BY THE APPELLANT AND WAS NOT PREJUDICIAL.
Utah, along with numerous other jurisdictions, limits
the rights of appellants in what can and cannot be appealable errors. Such situations come into existence
where defendants plead error to some facet of the trial
which they induced the court to make and did not object
or acquiesced to the decision made. This "after-the-fact"
argument is exactly what appellant Maguire is making
on this appeal. Simply stated, he is attempting to better
his chances by claiming error to the ruling of the court
which he asked the court to make. This "afterthought"
approach claims "prejudice" when in fact no such prejudice existed.
Appellant was charged with murder in the first degree but was not found guilty of that offense. He was
found guilty of murder in the second degree — a lesser
offense — and received a lighter sentence than if he had
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been convicted of the capital offense. The appellant
claims this is "prejudice." Respondent cannot understand how this conclusion is reached. It is not prejudicial
for an accused to get a lighter sentence when, as in this
case, the evidence is arguably strong enough to convince
a jury that premeditated murder took place and that the
appellant was guilty of that greater offense. The respondent urges the Court to recognize this non-prejudicial
decision of the court and not that claimed by the appellant.
A leading case of the United States Supreme Court
in this area, Johnson v. United States, 318 U. S. 18, 63
S. Ot. 549, 87 L. Ed. 704 (1943), held that the practice of
claiming error on appeal from self-induced requests at
trial cannot be sustained. The Court said:
"We cannot permit an accused to elect to
pursue one course at the trial and then, when
that has proved to be unprofitable, to insist on
appeal that the course which he rejected at the
trial be reopened to him. However, unwise the
first choice may have been, the range of waiver
is wide. Since the protection which could have
been obtained was plainly waived, the accused
cannot now be heard to charge the court with
depriving him of a fair trial. The court only followed the course which he himself helped to chart
and in which he acquiesced until the case was
argued on appeal. The fact that the objection
did not appear in the motion for new trial or in
the assignments of error makes clear that the
point now is a 'mere afterthought.'"
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If a party adheres to a particular mode of strategy
in open court and either misleads or joins in any error
induced by his strategy, and does not raise or claim such
error ait the time made, he should not be permitted to
complain of unfairness by repudiating the course of trial
he originally called for. Justice is not a system made
up of accepted standards where parties can go back on
their word — if you lose, repudiate your motions, agreements, and acts — but one where procedures are established to allow the orderly objection and handling of
errors which do take place. (See also Peole v. Pijal, 33
Cal. App, 3d 682, 109 Cal. Rptr. 230 (1973)).
Whether the cases have been criminal or civil, the
Utah Supreme Court has been quick to uphold the position referred to above. In State v. Aikers, 87 Utah 507,
51 P. 1052 (1935), the court said:
"We think the rule applicable that a party
cannot successfully assign as error a ruling which
he himself induced the court to make."
This position was reaffirmed in the brief opinion of the
court in State v. Fair, 28 Utah 2d 242, 501 P. 2d 107
(1972), where the defendant's counsel chose to examine
a witness outside of the presence of the jury and claimed
on appeal that it was prejudicial error for the judge to
have granted such motion. The court made clear that
the error complained of was self-induced and that it
would not be permitted to stand on appeal. The court
said:
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"Counsel chose not to do so, whether as a
matter of strategy or otherwise — and it does
not he in the mouth of defendant now to claim
error having either wittingly or unwittingly invited it"
In the present situation, it is not totally clear why
appellant Maguire wanted a trial without jury. Discussions pertaining thereto are off the record and are guarded
by the attorney-client privilege, but, whether the appellant's separate counsel convinced him "wittingly or unwittingly" to move for such waiver is now of no concern.
The fact is such motion was made, the judge was forced
to rule, he did so, and the appellant accepted the ruling
because it was what he desired. The appellant should
not be allowed to now claim, as he looks back over his
conviction, that prejudicial error of any magnitude took
place.
The Utah Supreme Court has spoken on this issue
on many other occasions. Many of them, however, concerned themselves with civil cases which do not have
the same gravity of effect. The respondent submits, however, that the principles and law laid down in those cases
apply just as well to the case at bar as to the situations
under which the holdings were rendered. Ludlow v. Colorado Animal By-Products Co., 104 Utah 221, 137 P. 2d
347 (1943), held:
"A party who takes a position which either
leads a court into error or by conduct approves
the error committed by the court, cannot later
take advantage of such error in procedure."
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Later, in Pettingill v. Perkins, 2 Utah 2d 266, 272
P. 2d 185 (1954), the court expanded and reaffirmed
what it had said many times before. The court said:
"Furthermore, it is well established that a
party cannot assign as error the giving of his
own requests. He cannot lead the court into
error and then be heard to complain thereof
• ••

Decisions from other jurisdictions supporting respondent's position are voluminous. Some recent cases in
support thereof are: People v. Delgado, 32 Gal. App. 3d
242, 108 Cal. Aptr. 399 (1973), holding that a party is
estopped from asserting error on appeal that was induced by his own conduct. "He may not lead a judge into
substantial error and then complain of it." (Emphasis
added); Mack v. United States, 310 A. 2d 234 (D. C.
App. 1973), holding that one cannot invite error and
complain of prejudice; People v. Shackelford, 511 P. 2d
19 (Colo. 1973), holding that the party who was the
instrument of injecting error must abide by the consequences of such error; People v. Miles, 13 111. App. 3d
45, 300 N. E. 2d 822 (1973), which held that a defendant
would not be permitted to argue an alleged error Where
his counsel of record actually invited and affirmatively
participated in the procedure which he now claimed as
error.
In the present case, Mr. Athay, counsel for appellant
Maguire, communicated with the court regarding waiver
of jury trial (R. 61-62). It becomes apparent from the
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record that the appellant desired to waive the jury trial,
and the counsel for the appellant explained his efforts
of informing Mr. Maguire of his right to jury trial, after
which the court went into detail regarding such rights
and waiver.
Simply because the appellant is represented by different counsel on appeal cannot mean that the appellant
can now reject his and his former counsel's actions and
motions before the trial judge. Certainly, the record
points out that appellant Maguire led the trial court into
allowing the waiver of jury trial.
In light of the foregoing analysis and authority, as
well as the clear implications and statements contained
in the record, it is respectfully submitted that appellant
Maguire cannot now claim injury for something he himself led the court to do. This is especially significant in
light of the fact that no prejudice took place, for the
entire history and record of his case contains no evidence
of such. It is therefore, submitted that on this ground
alone, the contentions of appellant Maguire should be
rejected.
POINT III.
THE APPELLANT'S WAIVER OF JURY
TRIAL WAS KNOWLEDGEABLY, COMPETENTLY, AND INTELLIGENTLY MADE
AND WAS NOT BASED ON ALLEGEDLY
MISLEADING INSTRUCTIONS REGARDING THE NUMBER OF JURORS.
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The respondent adheres to the philosophy that the
waiver of jury trial must be looked at with an eye focused
on fairness and understanding. Respondent contends
that the record clearly indicates that this was accomplished and that the appellant Maguire knowledgeably,
competently and intelligently waived the jury trial and
that such was done after serious deliberation on the
part of appellant.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter said in Adams v. United
States, 317 U. S. 269, 63 S. Ct. 236, 87 L. Ed. 268 (1942),
that:
". . . Whether or not there is an intelligent,
competent, self-proteoting waiver of jury trial
by an accused must depend upon the unique
circumstances of each case."
The "unique circumstances" of the present case substantiate the trial court's finding that the appellant properly waived his right. Mr. Athay told the court that the
appellant discussed the matter "in detail" with him, that
he as counsel believed the appellant understood the consequences in full, and further that the defendant/appellant answered Mr. Athay's question that he did so understand (R. 61).
In State v. Thornton, 22 Utah 2d 140, 449 P. 2d 987
(1969), this Court entertained an appeal regarding the
effective waiver of the Miranda warning. The court found
the dialogue between counsel and appellant sufficient
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to sustain the finding of the court that the waiver was
competently made. The court said:
"After the confession had been introduced,
counsel for defendant conducted a highly protracted intelligence test by question and answer, and except for some answers noted out of
context, defendant's testimony, in our opinion,
did not detract from a conclusion that there was
voluntariness of the confession.
". . . the question must be resolved from examining the whole record, — which we have
done in the insitant case . . ."
The respondent contends that the court in the case
at bar carried on such a "protracted intelligence test"
to see what frame of mind, what knowledge, what desires
and understanding the appellant had for the waiver to
be valid . Judges must act with v^hat they have available.
They are given power to accept waivers. This power and
authority is a mere folly if every time such a waiver is
effectuated one can claim incompetence for such waiver.
Counsel is provided to help eliminate such conduct. Here,
the court made its decision and that upon which the
appellant bases his appeal is not shown to have influenced his decision. There is no evidence showing the
trial judge erred in ascertaining a valid waiver.
The second time Mr. Athay spoke — immediately
after all parties said they were ready, he moved the court
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-2 (1953), that the
jury be waived (R. 61). Thus, it is apparent that even
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before the judge mentioned the jury or his interpretation
that eight jurors would be the number chosen, the appellant moved to waive it. Obviously, some consideration
had been given to the subject of waiver before coming
to court as substantiated by Mr. Athay's own words (R.
61). Therefore, the two or three times that the court
said "eight jurors" was not paramount or decisive to the
decision that was made.
In James, the error was carried to completion with
the eight man jury sitting instead of the twelve man
jury. As such, active error was continuous. In the present case, however, the major issue is "a jury or no jury."
The fact that no jury was chosen as the alternative and
that the defendant wanted the judge to hear the case
should carry sufficient weight in light of the fact that
the appellant decided on waiver before the false instruction. To sustain the finding that the mere mention of
eight jurors was error is a misinterpretation of justice.
There is no indication of reliance on the instruction, as
well as no indication that the defendant was thinking
anything different.
Because of this reasoning coupled with the fact that
before the defense began its part of the trial the court
ruled out the capital nature of the crime by reducing to
voluntary manslaughter or murder in the second degree
the crime under consideration, no prejudice or injury
came to the appellant. At all times he was benefited by
these rulings. First, he knew the death penalty would
not be applied. Second, the capital nature of the offense
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was dismissed. Third, the court went along with his
wishes regarding the jury.
The appellant had ample opportunity to question
and challenge the instruction but did not do so. No exception was taken, and no indication exists that the instruction played any role in the appellant's decision to
waive jury trial. Thus, no prejudicial error took place
which would warrant the reversal or remand of the present case.
Respondent therefore submits that if any error did
exist, it was not prejudicial. Since there exists ample
evidence to distinguish this case from that of James as
well as the fact that no prejudice existed it is requested
that this court find that the appellant's waiver was
knowingly, competently, and intelligently made.
POINT IV.
SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE EXISTS TO SUBSTANTIATE THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING OF SECOND DEGREE MURDER
Appellant alleges that insufficient evidence exists
to support his conviction. This court has periodically
reaffirmed standards for reviewing evidence which the
respondent feels are controlling. As early as State v.
Ferguson, 74 Utah 263, 279 P. 255 (1929), this Court said:
". . . As we view the testimony, the contention made that the evidence is insufficient to
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justify the verdict is wholly untenable. This
court, on appeal from conviction, cannot weigh
the evidence, and has held in effect that in the
absence of legislation to the contrary, the appellate court has no right to say what quantum of
evidence shall be necessary to establish a given
fact or set of facts, so long as there is substantial evidence in support of such fact or facts,"
(Citations omitted.) (Emphasis added.)
Several years later this "substantial evidence" test
was affirmed as it related to a jury verdict. The court
did, however, expound on the application of the test. In
State v. Ward, 10 Utah 2d 34, 347 P. 2d 865 (1959), the
court held:
"The rules governing the scope of review on
appeal as to the sufficiency of the evidence to
sustain the verdict are well settled; that it is the
prerogative of the jury to judge the credibility
of the witnesses and to determine the facts; that
the evidence will be reviewed in the light most
favorable to the verdict; and that if when so
viewed it appears that the jury acting fairly
and reasonably could find the defendant guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt, the verdict will not
be disturbed."
Just recently, this court once again made plain that only
When there is no reasonable basis for the conclusion of
guilt would a verdict be overturned. The statement in
State v. Schad, 24 Utah 2d 255, 470 P. 2d 246 (1970), is
as follows:
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"Unless upon our review of the evidence,
and the reasonable inferences fairly to be deduced therefrom, it appears that there is no
reasonable basis therein for such a conclusion,
we should not overturn the verdict." (Citations omitted.)
Is there in the facts presented below a "reasonable
basis" upon which the judge could convict? The appellant contends that the malice aforethought required for
murder in the second degree was not or could not be
proven and offered as sole evidence the testimony of the
accused — to say the least self-serving testimony. A
closer look at the totality of the facts indicates with
profound meaning that the judge or a jury could find
and actually did find all requisites needed for the conviction of appellant.
The testimony given at trial did bear out that the
victim had a known disposition for violence. Further,
it was confirmed that he owed the appellant money and
that on the evening of the homicide he had been the
instigator of an argument at his wife's motel room.
Many other facts were introduced which would lead
one to believe that more than a fit of passion caused the
death of the victim. First, when the appellant testified
that he was offered a ride, he also testified that the victim
did not want the gun in the car and yet the appellant
went to his own vehicle, got the gun and took it back
to the victim's car (R. 256-258). Second, at the motel
room the victim's wife testified that the victim said that
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the appellant had a .38 but that the appellant wasn't
going to scare him with it. This took place alter the argument between the appellant and Mr. Petersen and indicates that something had been said about the gun
during the argument (R. 188).
Third, Dr. Taylor testified that two bullets were
shot in the head of the victim, one from the front and
one from the back (R. 137). All testimony of the appellant indicated two shots, but that the first went off when
they were struggling for the gun which, according to
appellant's testimony, did not hit anyone, and the second shot went in the forehead of the victim at which time
the victim collapsed forward and was dead (R. 263, 35
seq.) Dr. Taylor indicated that one bullet traveled down
into the skull and the other upward (R. 138) which
would indicate different positions. He further testified
that he could not tell which one was fired first or which
bullet caused death. The respondent claims that this
evidence alone is sufficient to warrant a finding that
the appellant wanted the victim dead. Dr. Taylor testified that either bullet would have caused instant unconsciousness. Further, all evidence substantiates that the
shots were fired from different locations, thus the reason
for the angle dhanges as well as the points of entry. Such
evidence refutes the theory that it was not intended.
Further, in order for the victim to get the gun (which
he did not want in the car in the first place) he would
have had to reach across the car, in front of the appellant,
undo the glove compartment and remove the gun. All
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this was examined on direct and cross, and the appellant
said he could not recall what happened at that instant
(R. 315).
Next, the appellant testified that he had scratches
on his arm from the struggle over the gun. He did say,
however, that the victim's left hand was useless being
trapped on the outside of the steering wheel when he
went for the gun (R. 365). If this is so, how could the
arm have been scratched? The appellant denied receiving the scratches in moving the body out of the car.
Testimony further indicates that the appellant in
all previous encounbers with the victim had retreated
when arguments took place between them, but on this
occasion he refused to move or retreat and took the
offensive in grabbing for the gun (R. 319-320). The appellant further admitted that he knew the deceased had
lived with his wife while the appellant was in prison (R.
288) and that he could have made threats against the
victim (R. 289).
Based on the foregoing analysis of the facts and the
questionable areas raised, it becomes apparent that sufficient evidence exists to establish the "beyond a reasonable doubt" requirement needed for the finding of malice
aforethought. The court correctly found that the unlawful killing was murder in the second degree.
CONCLUSION
The respondent therefore submits that the trial court
did not err in allowing waiver of the jury and in no event
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was such a waiver prejudicial. The appellant further
waived the jury through intelligent, methodical, and
knowledgeable means and did not rely on the purported
error of instruction. Finally, the evidence contained
through testimony at trial substantiates that the trial
court was correct in its finding that the appellant was
guilty of murder in the second degree.
Respectfully submitted,
VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General
M. REID RUSSELL
Chief Assistant Attorney General
EARL F. DORIUS
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
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